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I. INTRODUCTION
While Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, would strike most
Americans as the starting date for terrorism-at least as understood by a
recently attacked America-the truth is very different both from the
American and international perspective. The scope and intensity of the
attack that Tuesday morning dramatically changed the American
response to terrorism in the short-term and long-term. The change in
America's response has impacted the American political debate, its way
of life, and its legal and policy perspectives regarding terrorism and
counter-terrorism alike.
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September 11 also had a global impact from an operational,
intelligence-gathering, policy and legal perspective. The world has
known terrorism for years, or at least parts of it have, and different
nations have responded in varying ways to attack. How nations respond
is often a reflection of their existing infrastructure, operational abilities,
political system, and culture.
However, as this article discusses, the different responses clearly
exhibit a common theme, that of responding while attempting to strike a
balance between legitimate national security interests and the rights of
the individual. That balance, from the perspective of both law and policy,
will be analyzed in the context of terrorist threats and actual attacks
alike. The analysis of the legal and policy responses is the core of this
article.
An examination of the American response must begin with a historical
perspective. In examining how the United States has responded, it is
important to assess actions-operational, intelligence-gathering, legislative,
and policy-taken in response to acts of terrorism.
II. HISTORICAL SURVEY
A. The Nixon Administration
The point of reference for determining when an American administration
was first confronted with terrorism is the Black September terrorist attack
at the 1972 Munich Olympics, which killed eleven Israeli athletes.' That
day, Americans were confronted with issues that had previously never
caught the public's eye: the Middle East, terrorists, and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO). The impact of that day, primarily as a
direct result of ABC's television coverage, was significant. Accordingly,
our survey of America's response and the actions undertaken by subsequent
administrations begins with the Nixon administration.
According to documents recently made public, the Nixon administration
established a terrorism taskforce. The documents reflect the administration's
concern regarding potential biological terrorism, but for various
1. See International Olympic Committee, Munich 1972: Games of the XX
Olympiad, http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/indexukaspOLGT=l&OLGY=1972 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2005).
2. See Frank Bass & Randy Herschaft, Nixon-Era Terrorism Task Force
Envisioned Today's Threats, GAFFNEY LEDGER, Jan. 24, 2005, available at http://www.
gaffneyledger.com/news/2005/0124/APNews/040.html.
reasons-the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and the president's subsequent
resignation from office-the taskforce died a natural death.
B. The Ford Administration
In response to the Church Committee,3 which investigated alleged
CIA abuses generally and in Latin America in particular, the Ford
administration issued Executive Order 11905,4 which outlawed the
assassination of leaders of sovereign states and declared: "No employee
of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, political assassination.... 6
This Order, reissued by subsequent administrations,6 was the Ford
administration's principal contribution to counter-terrorism efforts.
While there was deep concern in the United States about the activities of
the CIA, Executive Order 11905 curtailed counter-terrorism options
available to decision makers.
C. The Carter Administration
Jimmy Carter was elected in large part as a response to the Nixon
legacy, Watergate in particular. The Carter administration's primary
foreign policy focus was the protection of human rights. While this was
a laudable aim, the question that must be addressed in the context of this
article is the impact of such a policy on America's national security. In
November 1979, sixty-six Americans were taken hostage in Iran. 7 The
administration's operational response ended when a failed rescue
mission was aborted 8 and eight servicemen were killed.9 From a
counter-terrorism perspective, this mission should have sent red lights
flashing. An elite special forces unit was unable to move beyond the
staging area in the Iranian desert because of a sand storm, poor planning,
and incompetent command. Certainly, terrorists took note of America's
inability to respond to an act of international terrorism while Americans
were held hostage.
3. See Paul Wolf, CIA Powers and 1975 Church Committee, Sept. 22, 2001,
http://www.labournet.net/world/0109/us15.html.
4. See Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981),
available at www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo123333.html (last visited April 5, 2005).
5. Id.
6. Id. at pt. II, § 2.11.
7. DOYLE McMANuS, FREE AT LAST 241-45 (1981).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 245.
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D. The Reagan Administration
Ronald Reagan's counter-terrorism policy sounded firm and decisive:
"Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are
violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."' 0 But
the reality was very different from the articulated policy. In what are
considered the first terrorist suicide bombings conducted, hundreds of
Americans were killed in Beirut in two separate attacks." What was the
American response? President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of the
Marines from Beirut. 2  According to terrorists and their disciples,
Reagan's decision may be the seminal event in the history of modem
terrorism.1 3 Terrorist leaders understood and no doubt internalized the wide
gulf between America's stated policy and its actual implementation.
The deterrence threat may have died before it was born.
Similarly, following the brutal murder of Navy SEAL Robert Stethem
by Hezbollah terrorists in Beirut during a plane hijacking, the Reagan
administration's primary efforts were to negotiate an end to the
hijacking."4 While Stethem was shown being thrown, still alive, though
barely, onto the airport tarmac after being shot in the head, the American
response-bluster aside-was one of weakness.15
While President Reagan responded forcefully to the killing of
American servicemen in a Berlin disco by attacking Libyan targets,
including a presidential palace,' 6 and allegedly killing one of Mu'amar
Kadafi's children, serious international legal questions should have been
raised at the time. The attack appears to have been retaliatory in both
nature and scope, and thus in violation of international law, which does
10. Laura K. Donohue, In the Name of National Security: U.S. Counterterrorist
Measures, 1960-2000, 13 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 15 (Fall 2001).
11. See Frontline: Target America, Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988:
The Attacks, the Groups, and the U.S. response, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/target/etc/cron.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Terrorist Attacks on
Americans].
12. Id.
13. See also John Nichols, A Case For Exiing Iraq, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 24, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/24/opinion/main970016.shtml.
14. Frontline: Target America, Lessons Learned from the 1980s, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/targetletc/lessons.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Lessons Learned]; see also Terrorist Attacks on Americans, supra note 11; see also
David Silverstein, An American Strategy Against Terrorism (Aug. 23, 1991), http://www.
heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG847.cfm.
15. See Lessons Learned, supra note 14.
16. See Terrorist Attacks on Americans, supra note 11.
not permit acts of reprisal. Therefore, while Reagan's administration
took strong action, the legality of the attacks was nonetheless questionable.
Furthermore, while the United States was actively encouraging, if not
aiding, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan who were engaged in a pitched
battle with the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan,
Osama Bin Laden was developing the skills that would serve him
well in the decades to'come.' 7 America's singular focus on the Soviet
Union in the context of the Cold War prevented the Reagan
administration from correctly identifying the next threat to world order
and stability: terrorism.
E. The First Bush Administration
The first Bush administration's response to the 1988 Pan Am 103
terrorist attack, which led to the deaths of 270 innocent civilians
(including 189 Americans), was to invoke the criminal law paradigm by
initiating legal proceedings against the Libyan agents who were
responsible for blowing up the plane over Scotland. 18 The administration
was arguably hamstrung because the attack occurred over Scottish territory,
but clearly Americans flying in an American commercial airliner were
the intended targets. Not only did the administration choose not to
respond operationally against Libya, but its policy response was limited
to implementing a criminal law proceeding.
The issue of an appropriate paradigm for terrorism-criminal law,
traditional warfare (whereby prisoner of war status is granted to enemy
combatants), or a new paradigm recognizing that terrorism and counter-
terrorism are neither criminal acts nor acts of war-is a most important
question, but beyond the scope of this article.
F. The Clinton Administration
The first significant legislative effort against terrorism was the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Act). 19 President
Clinton had previously submitted antiterrorism legislation, but it was
bogged down in Congress. Not until the Oklahoma City and World
17. See Relating to Reestablishment of Representative Government in Afghanistan,
H.R. Con. Res 414, 106th Cong. (2000), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/R?r106:
FLDOO1 :H60645.
18. See Arlington National Cemetery, Pan Am Flight 103 Memorial Cairn-Lockerbie
Cairn, http://www.Arlingtoncemetery.org/visitor-information/Pan Am memorial.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2005).
19. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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Trade Center bombings did Congress and the administration agree upon
counter-terrorism legislation.2 °
The Act established a list of designated foreign terrorist organizations
(FTOs) and made it illegal for any person in the United States or subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States to provide funds or other material
to any group on the list. Representatives and members of a designated
FTO, if aliens, could be denied visas or otherwise excluded from the
United States. Finally, the Act forced American financial institutions to
block funds of designated FTOs and their agents, and report this action to
the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of the Treasury.2'
Against the backdrop of the first World Trade Center bombing, which
killed six people, the Subcommittee on International Operations of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on July 13, 1993.22
One of its primary purposes was for the Clinton administration to
articulate its counter-terrorism strategy. During the course of the hearings,
Assistant Secretary of State Timothy Wirth set forth that policy:
The Clinton administration is committed to exerting strong and steady
leadership in a rapidly-changing world. History has taught us the United States
and all nations can meet that challenge by maintaining a commitment to
democratic institutions and to the rule of law. Promoting democratic governments
and institutions that are fully accountable to their citizens is our most basic tool
for advancing free markets and our long-term national security, and addressing
the great and complex global issues of our time. Democracy does not sponsor
terrorism. It is no accident that states that do-Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba-are also
among the most repressive for their own citizens.
Mr. Chairman, let me assure you the Clinton administration will remain vigilant in
countering whatever threats may be posed by international terrorists to U.S.
interests.
Working in close consultation with the Congress, successive administrations have
developed a set of principles which continue to guide us as we counter the threat
posed by terrorists. These include making no concessions to terrorists, continuing
to apply increasing pressure to state sponsors of terrorism; forcefully applying the
20. Hearings and Markup of H. Res. 118, To Condemn the Release by the
Government of Malta of Convicted Terrorist Mohammed Ali Rezaq: Before the
Subcomm. on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1993) [hereinafter House Hearing on U.S.
Anti-Terrorism Policy].
21. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, supra note 19,
§ 219(a)(2)(C).
22. House Hearing on U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy, supra note 20.
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rule of law to international terrorists; and helping other governments improve their
capabilities to counter the threats posed by international terrorists.
23
The policy as expounded by Wirth was strong on rhetoric, but weak
on concrete operational counter-terrorism and practical legal and policy
initiatives that would have taken the fight to the terrorists. A common
recurrence in American counter-terrorism strategy is rhetoric that is not
matched by sustained action:
Another major element of our counter-terrorism policy is a firm response.
When President Clinton ordered the cruise missile strike against the
headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service, he delivered a firm, proportional and
necessary response to the continuing threat against the United States posed by
Iraq, as shown by the outrageous Iraqi attempt against the life of former
President Bush. The strike demonstrates that the Clinton administration will
respond vigorously, decisively and effectively to the terrorist threat around the
world.
24
To describe this response as "firm" is inaccurate: the administration
ordered the raid to be carried out in the middle of the night in order to
minimize collateral damage, as required by international law. Nevertheless,
a night-time bombing of a largely empty military building by the world's
only super-power in response to an attempted assassination of a former
president raises acute legal and policy questions.
Regarding the policy aspects of the attack, the issue is that of
effectiveness. Military-political doctrine suggests that an underwhelming
response negatively affects a nation's future deterrence ability. If indeed
Iraqi military intelligence played a significant role in the failed
assassination attempt, then the question that policy and decision makers
must ask is whether an attack on the building at night-time serves the
intended purpose.
A lack of response is arguably more effective, because the other side
is left guessing when a response will occur. A weak response-such as
the bombing of the building at night-may backfire from a policy
perspective, Wirth' s assessment notwithstanding.
International law mandates that actions such as the bombing of the
Iraqi military intelligence building meet certain requirements, such as
military necessity, proportionality, lack of alternatives to bombing, and
the minimizing of collateral damage. Furthermore, international law
clearly prohibits retaliatory attacks. However, Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter provides that a nation may attack in self-defense if an
armed attack occurs. 25 Because this action appears to be more reactive
than proactive, one must question its legality.
23. Id. at 84.
24. Id.
25. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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III. POST 9/11
A. Introduction
Since 8:43 a.m. on 9/11, the United States has been playing catch-up,
trying to make up for lost time and attempting to level the playing field
between itself and global terrorism. As American history demonstrates,
there is a tendency to go overboard under such circumstances.26 For
example, during World War II, an order promulgated by General Dewitt
mandated the exclusion of Japanese-American citizens from the West
Coast war area.27 The Supreme Court upheld Dewitt's exclusion order,
because it bore a direct relationship to the prevention of espionage and
sabotage, and because it was "in accordance with congressional authority."'
28
In an atmosphere of "bringing terrorists to justice" (President George
W. Bush's frequent phrase), a skewed moral compass is a real possibility,
threatening the foundation of our liberal democratic society and placing
its values in at least temporary abeyance. One of the critical tests for a
society is how it reacts in times of crisis. In attempting to determine the
response of the nation's leadership (elected and otherwise), the
following questions must be asked and subsequently addressed:
1) Did the leadership preserve core values?
2) Was caution thrown to the wind?
3) Did the leadership know how to differentiate
between real enemies and perceived enemies?
4) Did decision makers know how to protect the rights of
real enemies and protect perceived enemies from the
anger of its citizenry?
5) Were leaders able to restrain their worst instincts
and develop a sound and coherent policy based
on fundamental principles of the rule of law,
or did the response resemble the reaction that
led to the internment of thousands of loyal
American citizens without due process after
the attack on Pearl Harbor?
26. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
28. Id. at218.
B. The Current Bush Administration Response-Military
Commissions, Patriot Act, National Security
Strategy Document
President George W. Bush's response can best be studied by examining
three documents: the U.S.A. Patriot Act, overwhelmingly supported by
the Congress on October 25, 2001 by a vote of 98 yeas, 1 nay, and 1
abstention;29 the presidential order establishing military commissions
(November 2001); and the National Security Strategy Document (NSSD),
articulating the Bush preemption doctrine in the context of international
affairs (October 2002). The time line is significant: While the first two
documents were drafted in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack,
the NSSD was signed by President Bush a year later.
Post-9/11 American policy must be examined from both a domestic
and an international perspective. The Patriot Act is the legislative response
to an attack on American soil, and represents the tools and measures
Congress provided the administration in order to defend America.
The presidential order implements a quasi-judicial process for those
detained on the battlefield in Afghanistan or elsewhere and are suspected
of involvement with terrorism-be they foreigners or aliens living in
America, including those legally in the United States.30 However, the
NSSD reflects the administration's post 9/11 foreign policy, in that it
clearly articulates a determination to take the fight to terrorists. 31
1. The USA Patriot Act
32
The Patriot Act has been much discussed, debated, criticized and
misunderstood. Critics of the Bush administration see it as reflective of
the administration's disdain for basic civil liberties. Supporters of the
administration uphold it as the appropriate legislative response to an
attack on America. The sections of the Act that are of particular relevance
to this article are 203, 206, 213, 215, 218, and 411. To summarize,
section 203 allows information from grand juries to be shared with the
CIA without prior approval by a judge.33 Section 206 grants roving
29. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
30. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Military Order Terrorism].
31. See generally The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, (Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (on file
with author) [hereinafter National Security Strategy].
32. Patriot Act, supra note 29.
33. Id. § 203.
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surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), but requires a court order approving an electronic surveillance to
direct any person to furnish necessary information, facilities, or technical
assistance in circumstances where the court finds the actions of the
surveillance target may thwart the identification of a specified person.34
Section 213, also known as the "sneak and peek" exception to the
"knock and announce" rule, states that notification of searches can be
delayed if it would seriously jeopardize the investigation.35 Section 215
authorizes the government to seize any tangible items sought for an
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.36 This may include records from banks, credit bureaus,
telephone companies, hospitals, or libraries. Section 218 amends FISA to
require that an application for an electronic surveillance order or search
warrant certify that a significant purpose (formerly "the sole or main
purpose") of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.1
7
Section 411 of the Patriot Act addresses the issue of the definition of
terrorist activity:
[Section 411] [i]ncludes within the definition of "terrorist activity" the use of
any weapon or dangerous device, redefining "engage in terrorist activity" to
mean, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, to:
(1) commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention
to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; (2) prepare or plan
a terrorist activity; (3) gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;
(4) solicit funds or other things of value for (aa) a terrorist activity or (bb) a
terrorist organization [with an exception for lack of knowledge]; (5) solicit any
individual (aa) to engage in prohibited conduct... (bb) or for membership in a
terrorist organization [with an exception for lack of knowledge]; or (6) commit an
act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support,
including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds
or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons
(including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training (aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity; (bb) to any individual
who the actor knows or reasonably should know has committed or plans to
commit a terrorist activity; (cc) or to a terrorist organization [with an exception
for lack of knowledge]...
34. Id. § 206; see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(2)(B) (1978) [hereinafter FISA].
35. Patriot Act, supra note 29, § 213.
36. Id. at § 215.
37. Id. at § 218; FISA § 1805(c)(2)(B).
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The term "terrorist organization" means.. .a group: (1) designated under [the
immigration and nationality act]; (2) [by the secretary of state]; or (3) a group of
two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in [terrorist-
related activities] .... 38
Section 411 further provides for the retroactive application of amendments
under the Act.39 It stipulates that an alien shall not be denied entry or
face deportation because of a relationship to an organization that was not
designated as a terrorist organization prior to enactment of this Act.40 It
also states that the amendments under this section shall apply to all
aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings, on the date of or after the
enactment of this Act.41 The Act further directs the Secretary of State to
notify specified congressional leaders seven days prior to designating an
42organization as a terrorist organization.
Professor Steven Schulhofer has written about the necessity of the
Patriot Act and whether its provisions fundamentally changed the ability
of American law enforcement to conduct counter-terrorism operations
within the parameters of the Constitution. According to Schulhofer, the
pre-September 11 regime of constitutional and statutory limits on surveillance
and intelligence gathering was a complex mixture of stringent restraints,
permissive powers, and awkward compromises. The Patriot Act shifted
this balance in the direction of greatly expanded investigative power,
especially by increasing opportunities to use e-mail and internet searches
to conduct clandestine physical searches, to search under flexible FISA
standards, and to use all of these new opportunities to investigate crimes
entirely unrelated to terrorism.
43
An important Fourth Amendment safeguard is the requirement of immediate
notification when a search is conducted. Officers executing a warrant must
knock and announce their presence before entering, except when doing so would
expose them to danger or risk destruction of the evidence sought. Similarly, the
officers must give a copy of the warrant to the occupant or leave it at the premises if
she is not present, again subject to a narrow exception for situations where such
notice would endanger lives or seriously impede an investigation. These notice
provisions serve to ensure that the target of the search will know that it occurred
and have an opportunit to ensure that the particularity limitations of the
warrant were respected.
44
Schulhofer argues that until September 11, exceptions to these notice
requirements were governed by judicial decisions that examined on a





43. See STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 50-51 (2002).
44. Id. at 43.
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case-by-case basis the need for conducting a clandestine search (a
"sneak-and-peek") without immediate notification. Schulhofer states
that "[t]he PATRIOT Act adds to federal law a provision that for the
first time gives statutory authorization for clandestine intrusions and
defines in broad terms the grounds that can justify delay in notifying the
target that her home was searched."'
Furthermore, Schulhofer has written that:
[a] reasonable argument can be made that the case law on clandestine searches
needed to be clarified by legislation. A reasonable argument can likewise be
made that the broad sneak-and-peek authority codified in the PATRIOT Act is
preferable to the more restrictive view endorsed in some of the cases.
Arguments can fairly be made in the other direction as well. But however that
debate might best be resolved, this problem has nothing to do with the fight
against terrorism. For international terrorism cases, authority to conduct
clandestine searches already existed-in much broader terms-under FISA.
The new authority conferred by the PATRIOT Act is simply not needed for
such cases, nor is it limited to terrorism cases; it is available in any criminal
investigation. And because the new sneak-and-peek authority is exempted from
the PATRIOT Act's sunset provision, it will remain in effect indefinitely. There
was no justification for adding this issue to an already large emergency agenda
after September 11 and for using the momentum of that occasion to obtain
endorsement for the Justice Department's preferred approach to an unrelated
problem.
46
2. The Military Order
The 2001 Military Order47 issued by President Bush was based on a
previous presidential order issued by President Roosevelt. In Ex Parte
Quirin, following the arrest of German saboteurs caught in New Jersey
and Florida,48 the U.S. Supreme Court generally upheld the president's
authority to create military tribunals for war crimes.49 As a result of the
findings of the commissions, the saboteurs, including an American citizen,
were executed.50 President Bush's order, which established military
commissions for the purpose of trying non-American citizens allegedly
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Military Order Terrorism, supra note 30.
48. Memorandum from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel for ACLU, to
Congress on President Bush's Order Establishing Military Tribunals (May 6, 2002), at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=10312&c=39; see also George Lardner,
Jr., Nazi Saboteurs Captured! FDR Orders Secret Tribunal: 1942 Precedent Invoked by
Bush Against al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002, at W12 [hereinafter Lardner, Nazi
Saboteurs Captured!].
49. ExParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1942).
50. Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured!, supra note 48.
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supporting, aiding and abetting al-Qaeda throughout the world, has been
widely criticized in the United States and abroad. Critics5' have repeatedly
commented on what have been described as serious violations of due
process in both the Military Order and the subsequently issued military
instructions. 2  Liberal democratic societies countering terrorism while
balancing legitimate national security requirements against equally
legitimate individual rights must be guided by the principle that even
alleged terrorists have rights. The Bush Administration has been repeatedly
criticized, even by U.S. courts, for its denial of fundamental due process
rights.
The initial criticism focused on a number of issues:
1) The failure to consult with Congress before issuing the
order;
2) The fact that Congress's resolution authorizing the use
of force, enacted September 14, 2001, does not provide
for the establishment of the commissions;
3) The lack of an independent appeals process;
4) The detainee's inability to challenge the cause for
detention;
5) A reduced evidentiary standard allowing the introduction
of any evidence found to be of "probative value to a
reasonable person.,
53
During the course of the military operation conducted by the United
States and the coalition members in Afghanistan, 650 men who were
either captured in connection with the war or alleged to have connections to
al-Qaeda were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.54 Much has been
made of the decision to establish the detention camp at Guantanamo. In
retrospect, the decision seems to have been based on two primary
considerations: a desire to detain the captured men far from the zone of
51. See Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BooKs, Nov. 6, 2003, at 37-38,; see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1277 (2002).
52. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 51, at 1277; Department of Defense, Military
Commission Order No. 1: Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain
Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.
dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf (on file with author) [hereinafter Military
Commission Order, Procedures].
53. See Dworkin, supra note 51; see also Katyal & Tribe, supra note 51, at
1266-67, 1277.
54. Human Rights First, The Guantanamo Detainees, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
us law/after91 1/PDF/Guantanamo%20Detainees.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (on file
with author).
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combat, and to not detain them in the United States, where the argument
could be made that they must be granted full constitutional rights and
privileges.55
3. Congressional Hearings
Hearings held before the Senate Judiciary and Armed Services
Committees in December 200156 brought to focus many of these criticisms.
Members of the committee, including Senators Leahy, Kennedy, and
Levin among others, roundly criticized the administration, emphasizing
that it had failed to consult Congress prior to issuing the order, and
questioning the order's constitutionality from a separation of powers
perspective.57
Administration witnesses-Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz
and Department of Defense General Counsel Haynes-were adamant
that the president was constitutionally authorized to issue the order
without consulting with Congress, based on its "authorization for use of
military force., 58 Senators Warner and Sessions argued that issuing such
an order is an inherent presidential power in a time of war.59
4. Department of Defense Instructions
Notwithstanding the administration's testimony before the Senate, in
the months that followed, the Department of Defense issued a series of
instructions intended to serve as rules for the commissions.6 ° Unlike the
administration's issuance of the Military Order, the Department of
Defense published the instructions and invited public response prior to
55. Transcript of Dep't of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Pace, June 14, 2005, http://www.defenselink.miil/transcripts/2005/tr2OO50614-secdef
3042.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (stating that Guantanamo Bay was chosen
because the U.S. need a safe and secure location to detain and interrogate enemy
combatants); Clive Stafford-Smith, No Justice in Guantanamo Bay, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 1,
2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,1373, 851565,00.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) (arguing that Guantanamo Bay was chosen to "create a legal
pretext" that detainees were not on American sovereign territory).
56. See Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Military





60. Military Commission Order, Procedures, supra note 52.
their implementation.6' Many human rights organizations responded,
mainly negatively.62
5. Results
To date the commissions have not issued a single ruling. The process
has been continuously held up, both because of intervention by
American courts, and also because the commissions were confronted
with issues that might have been avoided had the administration chosen
to consult with Congress. Equally importantly, the administration failed
to consult with constitutional and international law experts and instead
relied solely on problematic precedent (namely Quirin, whose relevance is
doubtful because it took place in the "declared war" of World War II).
Administration advisors (lawyers and non-lawyers alike), whose rush to
action was possibly understandable in the short term, have in the long
run ill served the President and the nation. The failure to consider that
detainees might demand to represent themselves and the implications of
such a legitimate desire, is but one example of a rushed and not carefully
considered internal process.
6. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
Furthermore, as a direct result of a judicial finding,63 the administration
was forced to establish "combatant status review tribunals" in order to
determine both the status of the detainees and whether their continued
detention was warranted based on the available intelligence information.
These combatant status review tribunals are intended to reflect the
guidance provided by the Supreme Court's decisions in Rasul and
Hamdi, namely that a detainee must be afforded notice and opportunity
to contest the determination that he is an enemy combatant.64 According
to the Department of Defense's combatant status review tribunal
summary, as of March 29, 2005, in 558 hearings, 520 detainees have
been deemed enemy combatants, and 38 have been deemed not to be
enemy combatants.
65
In the aftermath of 9/11 the administration debated the detainees'
status and the applicability and relevance of the Geneva Conventions. In
61. Id.
62. See Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper on U.S. Military Commissions (June
25, 2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/military-commissions.pdf (on file with author).
63. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
64. See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. See also Defense
Department Background Briefing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7,
2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040707-098 1.html.
65. Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (on file with author).
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a memo written by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White
House General Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the administration's position
is clearly presented: Geneva Convention protections do not pertain to the
detainees. 6 Similarly, the question of the detainees' status had to be
addressed: were they to be considered prisoners of war or enemy
combatants, and might they be held indefinitely? Prisoners of war have
clearly defined rights and protections, and the state holding them has
commensurate obligations according to the laws of war and the Geneva
67Conventions. Enemy or illegal combatants also have protected rights
although, unlike prisoners of war,68 they may be brought to trial.69
Neither may be tortured.7°
To date, seven members of the U.S. Armed Forces have been tried for
the severe violations committed at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and
two additional cases are pending. Furthermore, two independent investigations,
the Schlesinger Commission and the internal Army review, contain
important and disturbing information on the torture and mistreatment of
prisoners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. 7'
While U.S. policy is not to condone torture, the Bybee memo and
subsequent statements and actions on the part of administration officials
appear to have created a climate where such basic violations of human
rights are acceptable, if not encouraged. In the context of counter-terrorism,
a failure by senior leadership to clearly and unequivocally address the
rights of detainees and to issue command directives, combined with a
forceful response to known violations, will inevitably lead to violations
such as those the United States is confronted with today.
66. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes 1I, General Counsel for the
Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
012202bybee.pdf (on file with author).
67. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 4, 13,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
68. Id. art. 99.
69. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942).
70. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
67, art. 3, 17; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War arts. 4, 32, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
71. See James Ross, Hold Officials Responsible, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/27/usdom9275.htm.
C. The National Security Strategy Document
The following clauses of the NSSD clearly articulate the proactive
foreign policy developed and espoused by the Bush administration after
9/11, and implemented throughout the world. U.S. policies in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Egypt are only the most obvious examples of this implementation.
1) "America will hold to account nations that are compromised
by terror, including those who harbor terrorists-because the
allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United
States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the
terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek
to deny them sanctuary at every turn."
2) "We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and
curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies....
And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America
will act against such emerging threats before they are fully
formed.... In the new world we have entered, the only path
to peace and security is the path of action."
3) "We make no distinction between terrorists and those who
knowingly harbor or provide aid to them."
4) "[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise
our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our
people."
5) "For centuries, international law recognized that nations need
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to
defend themselves against forces that present an imminent
danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of
an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries .... The United States has
long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a
sufficient threat to our national security... . To forestall or
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States
will, if necessary, act preemptively.... [T]he United States
cannot remain idle while dangers gather. '72
72. National Security Strategy, supra note 31, at Introduction, ch. III, V.
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IV. ISRAEL
Over the years, Israel has often been criticized for its response to
terrorism. For those who believe that the occupation of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip is inherently illegal under international law, any
response to terrorism in these areas is consequently illegal. This article
does not seek to address the political and legal issues related to the
occupation, which resulted from the 1967 Six-Day War. Rather, the focus
will be Israel's legal and policy responses to significant terror attacks.
A. Introduction
Since Israel has been under attack literally from the moment of
inception (May 1948), it is arguable that an article analyzing how the
state responds to significant attacks is irrelevant to the Israeli experience.
However, over the past four years Israel has faced a different form of
terror threat, and therefore addressing the change in its response is
clearly relevant.
As these lines are written, there is talk of a "window of opportunity"
created by the death of Yassar Arafat. Shortly after Arafat's death,
Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Abbas met
for a summit hosted by President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah
of Jordan.73 Prior to the summit, the government of Israel voted to freeze
the policy of targeted killing, though it reserved the right to renew it if
the Palestinians should prove unable or unwilling to eliminate terrorism.
74
In addition, the defense minister adopted the recommendation of a high-
level Israel Defense Forces committee report recommending the halting of
house demolitions. 75 High-level joint security committees have met to plan
the implementation of the transfer of security from the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Furthermore, Israel began
disengaging its settlements from the Gaza Strip and four Jewish settlements
in the northern part of the West Bank in the summer of 2005.76
73. David R. Sands, Egypt Readies Troops to Ensure Peace Deal, THE WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at Al.
74. The Day that Peace Broke Out?, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.economist.com.agenda/displayStory.cfin?story_id=3643056; The Middle East
Peace Summit, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2005.
75. Greg Myre, Israel Halts Decades-Old Practice of Demolishing Militants'
Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at Al.
76. Steven Erlanger, No Honeymoon for Palestinian Chief N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2005, at A6.
It has been Israel's policy since 1967 to respond to terrorism with a
combination of measures-some intended to punish the individual
terrorist, others aimed at deterring those who might contemplate acts of
terrorism. Israeli methods have included the following measures:
(1) demolishing the home of terrorists; (2) imposing curfews on
neighborhoods and towns, either in response to intelligence information
indicating a terrorist attack is imminent, or in response to a completed
attack; (3) deporting terrorists; (4) placing suspected terrorists in
administrative detention when criminal evidence is unavailable, or when
concern for informants' security prevents the presentation of the evidence
in a court of law; and (5) trying terrorists in a court of law. All of these
measures have been based on Israeli law, international law, or
regulations inherited from the British mandate.
All actions undertaken by the executive in Israel are reviewable by the
judiciary-namely the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of
Justice. Thus, the Israel Defense Forces (the executive in the occupied
territories) must always remain cognizant of the possibility that the
Court will intervene and order the IDF to refrain from a particular course
of action.
B. Post-2000 Policy
Since 2000, Israel has significantly changed the counter-terrorism
methods it applies to combat Palestinian terrorism. Rather than relying
on measures that were considered appropriate and effective between
1967 and 2000, the IDF has implemented a far more aggressive policy.
Israel has defined the present situation as an "armed conflict short of
war," rather than an intifada (an Arabic word that literally means a
throwing or riding off). The Intifada of 1987-1993, characterized by stone
throwing, Molotov cocktails, massive demonstrations, multiple stabbings
and the closing of businesses, was fundamentally different from the
threat of the past four years, which has been characterized by Kassam
missiles, mortar shells and suicide bombers.
To understand Israel's change in strategy and tactics, the reader
must ask how the threat emanating from the Intifada differs from that
presented by the armed conflict of the past four years, and why the
present situation enables-in the state's eyes-such a fundamental
change in the state's counter-terrorism policy and legislation. In the past
four years, Israel has introduced a number of new policies, of which two
will be analyzed: targeted killings and the construction of the security
fence.
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C. Suicide Bombers
The change in Israeli counter-terrorism policy is primarily a response
to the threat presented by Palestinian suicide bombers. A successful
suicide bombing is the work of a well-orchestrated, difficult to penetrate,
highly disciplined, financially solvent terror organization-not the act of
a lone individual. The reality of the post-9/11 suicide bomber and the
need for a strategy to counter it is something that all nations must take
into account, as the United States, Russia, Great Britain, Spain, Indonesia,
and Saudi Arabia can well attest. While suicide bombers do not threaten
the very existence of these nations, they greatly affect the daily lives of
millions of innocent civilians. Governments' response in terms of law and
policy to this relatively new threat is one of the major topics to be
addressed in this article. Israel's responses, discussed below, are instructive
in the context of the global reaction to terrorism.
D. What Is Targeted Killing?
Targeted killing reflects a deliberate decision to order the death of a
particular terrorist. It is important to emphasize that an individual will
be targeted only if he presents a serious threat to public order and safety,
based on criminal evidence and/or reliable, corroborated intelligence
information that clearly implicates him.7 (To date, women have not
been targeted.) Intelligence information is considered corroborated when it
is confirmed by at least two separate, unrelated sources. In addition, a
reasonable alternative to the targeted killing must not exist. Stated
differently, the authorities must pursue all other reasonable means to
incapacitate the terrorist under international law, and such efforts must
prove fruitless before these authorities may resort to targeted killings.
According to international law, it is imperative that every effort be
made to ensure that collateral damage is limited to an absolute minimum.
Accordingly, when military commanders plan a targeted killing, they
must do their best to avoid injury and damage to innocent civilians.79
77. Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 319, 322 (2004) [hereinafter Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense].
78. Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REv. 187, 198-99 (1984).
79. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 57.
According to the Jerusalem Post, the IDF has expanded the scope of
targeted killing to include terrorists training for an attack.80  In
September 2004, an Israel Air Force helicopter attacked terrorists who
were training at a base in Syria. The attack was not aimed at a specific
terrorist who was engaged either in planning or executing a specific
attack, and can therefore be considered an expansion of the targeted
killing policy. The attack on the training base, which followed a double
suicide bombing in Beer Sheva,81 a city in southern Israel, was aimed at
terrorists in training, without specific knowledge as to their particular
intentions. The raid raises important questions regarding violations of
another nation's sovereignty in the context of counter-terrorism, and the
limitations on active self-defense.
1. Israel's Legal Arguments for Targeted Killing
The best way to understand Israel's policy is to examine its response
to a petition filed in Israel's Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, against the practice of targeted killings. In Public Committee
Against Torture, Committee for Clean Environment and Human Rights
vs. The State of Israel (decision pending),82 the state, arguing that the
petition should be denied, made a number of points:
The State first argued that the present conflict between Israel and
Palestinian terror organizations is an "armed conflict. 83 As part of the
law of armed conflict, terrorists taking part in attacks against civilian or
public targets are illegal combatants, not civilians, and are therefore
legitimate targets. "Acts of terrorism against a country by non-state
sponsored organizations or individuals should be considered more than
just criminal acts. Instead, they should be considered acts of war against
the victim nation. '84 In the State of Israel vs. Marwaan Baraghuti,85 the
80. Arieh O'Sullivan, The Army Redefines the 'Ticking Bomb,' THE JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 13, 2004, at 2.
81. See Israel Holds Syria Responsible for Double Suicide Bombing, Sept. 1, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-09-01 -mideast_x.htm.
82. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture vs. The State of Israel,
(decision pending).
83. Id. (This characterization had been previously accepted and adopted by the
Supreme Court in a number of decisions). There are at least three different schools of
thought about how to classify the fight against terrorism (which has been referred to as
the new form of warfare): as an international armed conflict; as not an international
armed conflict; as a unique form of armed conflict between a state and a non-state actor
that has not been addressed in international conventions and requires separate, distinct
international law agreements.
84. Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in
the Emerging War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1,4 (2002).
85. CrimC (TA) 092134/02 Israel v. Marwan Barghouti [2002] IsrDC_, available
at http://www.newyork.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOmz8O.
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Tel Aviv District Court ruled that terrorists who attack civilians are not
"lawful combatants" entitled to POW status.
The principle of proportionality must be respected when implementing
the policy of targeted killing. Additionally, targeted killing is used only
when the targeted terrorist cannot be arrested using reasonable means, and
is therefore in accordance with international principles requiring
exhaustion of all reasonable alternatives.
The state cited the following: "legal scholars who have examined the
jus ad bellum dimensions of the terrorism question would appear to
agree on at least four basic principles:"
i. If a state has suffered an armed attack by terrorist actors, a
state is entitled to defend itself forcibly;
ii. A victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be
timely;
iii. A victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be
proportionate;
iv. A victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be
discriminate and taken against targets responsible in some
way for the armed attack.
86
One of the critical questions that must be answered is whether suicide
bombers and those involved in terrorist infrastructure are legitimate
targets even though they are not soldiers in the traditional sense of the
word. In the present conflict, terrorists who play a direct role in attacks
are viewed as illegal combatants, who are not entitled, inter alia, to
POW status, and are viewed as legitimate targets. Furthermore, the scope
of a legitimate target is not limited to the potential suicide bomber who,
according to corroborated and reliable intelligence, is on his or her way
to carry out a suicide bombing. Rather, the legitimate target is identified
as any Palestinian who plays a significant role in the suicide bombing
infrastructure-that is, "doers" who execute attacks, and "senders" who
orchestrate them.
87
Targeted killings are primarily criticized based on the premise that
they constitute either extrajudicial killings or assassinations. 88 It should
be added that targeted killings have been carried out by various
86. Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend "Don't Tread on Us": International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 153, 187-90 (1993).
87. Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, supra note 77, at 328.
88. Id. at 329.
governments, including the United States and the United Kingdom. The
United States executed a targeted killing in response to the attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, despite the fact that one of its targets was evidently a U.S.
citizen. While it is true that the targeted individual is not afforded a
hearing or granted the right to appeal the decision to target him, he is not
an innocent civilian according to the Geneva Conventions.9" Rather, he
is an illegal combatant who has either participated in terror attacks or
ordered them to be carried out.
An extrajudicial killing, according to Amnesty International, "is an
unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or
with its acquiescence ...[reflecting] a policy ...to eliminate specific
individuals as an alternative to arresting them." 91 Unlike military forces
that practice extrajudicial killing, the IDF resorts to targeted killing only
when arrest is not an option. Furthermore, targeted killing is neither
punishment nor reprisal for the commission of an act that is illegal under
international law.92 Its primary objective is the prevention of a terrorist
act intended to kill innocent Israeli civilians, and therefore it does not
fall under the definition of extrajudicial killings. Extrajudicial killings reflect
a government policy to kill the enemies of the state not for operational or
self-defense purposes, but as a means of punishing opponents of the
state. In almost all instances of extrajudicial killings, the victims are
domestic political opponents by whom regimes feel threatened. Rather
than arrest these opponents, regimes prefer to eliminate them.
It is critical to distinguish between targeted and extrajudicial killing.
Targeted killings occur when arrest of the individual poses an
extraordinary operational risk, whereas extrajudicial killing occurs when
the incapacitation of political opponents through arrest is clearly
operationally possible. 93 Furthermore, extrajudicial killings are domestic
in orientation: they violate civil rights and are not part of counter-
terrorism operations. By contrast, a state fighting terrorism must take all
measures to protect itself against terrorists whose modus vivendi is
89. See John Diamond & Dave Moniz, Missile Takes Out Cole Attack Suspect,
USAToDAY, Nov. 5, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-11-04-yemen-side-
usat_x.htm; see also U.S. kills al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-11-04-yemen-explosion-x.htm.
90. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 79,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 at art. 50.
91. J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under
International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1071 n. 13 (2002).
92. Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 175 Mw. L.
REv. 184, 185-86 (2003) (stating that "[reprisals under international law are prima facie
unlawful").
93. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means ofDefence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 179 (April, 2005).
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killing, and not political dissent. Targeted killing is a form of preemption
and is not punitive in its purpose. Thus, the connotations of extrajudicial
killing are inappropriate in the context of targeted killing.
Targeted killing is also distinguishable from assassination. An
assassination is the killing of a political leader or a statesman and,
according to international law, involves treachery or perfidy.94 Terrorists
are not political leaders or statesmen and should never be considered as
such. The difference between a terrorist and a political leader is an
important one in targeted killings. For example, Arafat, though he
supported terrorism, would not have been an appropriate object of
targeted killing because of his status as a political leader.
2. Policy Concerns
Israel's policy of targeted killings has been highly criticized. Professor
Michael Scharf suggests four arguments to show why, even if targeted
killings are legal, the policy permitting them may still be misguided:
1) Instances of collateral damage;
2) Instances of mistaken identity;
3) Cascading threats to the world order;
4) Strengthening enemy morale via martyrdom. 95
Examining counter-terrorism requires more than arguing the law in what
is considered a gray area by most international law experts, but also
understanding the policy aspects involved in the decision-making
process. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the policy must be addressed.
Israel considers the policy of targeted killing effective for the following
reasons:
1) Terrorists understand that Israel has been able to penetrate
informants into their cells.
2) Terrorists have had to change their living and sleeping
habits on a regular basis.
3) A significant number of terrorists have been killed.
94. Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L.
REv. 615,621 (1992).
95. Michael P. Scharf, In the Cross Hairs of a Scary Idea, WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
2004, at B 1.
3. Post-Arafat
At the request of the Palestinian Authority, Israel recently decided to
halt targeted killings.96 The request reflects the significance Palestinians
attach to the matter. Furthermore, the Minister of Defense has adopted
the recommendations of an internal IDF commission to halt the policy of
razing the homes of suspected Palestinian terrorists.97
Over the course of the past twenty years, the IDF has justified its
house-razing policy as a deterrent: those considering committing an
attack of terrorism would be deterred if they understood what fate
awaited their family's home. This argument was repeatedly made by the
state to the High Court of Justice, and has received judicial sanction over
the course of twenty years. After careful review, the internal IDF commission
reached the conclusion that the policy did not have a deterrent effect,
and therefore recommended that it be halted. 98
The freezing of targeted killings must be understood in the context of
renewed relations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel in a post-
Arafat age. While the Sharon government has clearly indicated that the
policy may be re-implemented should the Palestinian Authority prove
unable or unwilling to curtail Palestinian terrorism, the government's
decision reflects a major change in policy. It must be noted that Israel
considers both the policies of targeted killings and housing demolitions
to be legal according to international law, and its decision to freeze them
is policy based. This decision serves to reinforce one of the guiding
principles of this article: counter-terrorism must be examined from legal
and policy perspectives equally.
4. The Security Fence
The approximately 385 mile security fence that Israel has erected on
the Palestinian side of the Green Line has been described by Israel as a
self-defensive measure implemented in response to Palestinian terrorism.99
According to the Israeli government, the primary purpose of the fence is
to prevent infiltration into Israel by Palestinian terrorists. 00 Though the
fence has been heavily criticized both domestically and internationally,
96. Ben Wedeman, Guy Raz & Andrea Koppel, Mideast Cease-fire Expected
Tuesday, CNN.coM, Feb. 7, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/07/
mideast/.
97. Myre, supra note 75.
98. Id. (stating that the decision could be re-examined "if an extreme change in
circumstances takes place").
99. See Israel's Security Fence, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/
fence.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
100. Id.
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Israel has responded in the legal and political arenas by pointing to
statistics showing that the fence has been highly effective in fulfilling its
primary purpose as defined by the government-protecting innocent
Israeli civilians. 10 1 According to the Israeli government, there has been a
90% reduction in Palestinian terrorist acts in areas in which the fence
stands,10 2 proving, from the government's perspective, that the fence is
effective.
The legality of the fence has been challenged both in the Israeli
Supreme Court 0 3 and in the International Court of Justice. 1 4 The
government defended its decision to erect the security barrier by arguing
that it balanced the nation's legitimate national security concerns-the
protection of its citizens-against the rights of the residents of the
Palestinian Authority. In arguing that the fence was constructed on the
Palestinian side of the West Bank for strategic and topographic reasons,
the state denied that the ultimate purpose of the fence was an illegal grab
of Palestinian land. 105 Nevertheless, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled
that, while the fence is legal, it affects "the fabric of [Palestinian] life"
by separating farmers from their land, children from their schools,
friends from neighbors, and making it very difficult for Palestinians to
move freely within the Palestinian Authority's area.10 6 Accordingly, the
Court ordered the state to re-contour the fence in order to minimize the
damage. 1
07
As has previously been noted, balancing legitimate national security
concerns and the rights of the individual is in many ways the essence of
counter-terrorism policy, when it is developed and implemented by
liberal democratic states. The fence is emblematic of the balancing
dilemma. According to many jurists, the fence represents a major violation
101. The Anti-Terrorist Fence-An Overview, http://secuityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfin/Data/
48152.doc (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
102. Id.
103. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel &
Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank [2004] IsrSC , available at http:/www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fencesct.html (last visited April 5, 2005) [hereinafter
Beit Sourik].
104. See generally The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, No. 131, 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9,
2004).
105. See Beit Sourik, supra note 103, at paras. 12-15.
106. Id. at paras. 82-85.
107. Id. atpara. 85.
of international law.'0 8  On the other hand, a state must take all legal
measures to protect its citizens. Herein lies the core of the dilemma: how
does a state implement self-defensive measures while protecting civil rights?
It is important to note that active self-defense, as a policy, is very
much exemplified by the fence. Ultimately, Israel decided to construct
the fence (which is assiduously not referred to as a wall) because of a
belief-ultimately shown to have statistical validity-that it would prove
effective in preventing the infiltration of suicide bombers into Israel. 10 9
According to Israel, the two issues discussed above-targeted killing
and the security fence-serve a common purpose: preventing suicide
bombers from achieving their goal. International law requires states to
actively seek alternatives and to develop and implement policies
that will minimize property damage and the loss of innocent lives in
their efforts to combat terrorism. In facing a new threat-suicide
bombers-Israel implemented a double-edged approach: the policy of
targeted killing, advocating the killing of terrorists based on intelligence
information and/or criminal evidence (as will be discussed later) and the
construction of the security fence, creating a barrier that negatively
impacts one group of innocent civilians while attempting to save the
lives of other innocent civilians. Though the policies have been deemed
successful by the enacting state (Israel), the criticism has been consistent
and severe. These policies exemplify the need to not only balance national
security concerns and individual rights, but also to consider what actions
a state ultimately takes and the attendant criticism of its policies.
V. RussiA
A. Introduction
Over the past few years post-Soviet Union Russia has faced terrorism
similar to that faced by the United States and Israel. Chechen terrorist
groups-whether acting alone or assisted by international terrorists-have
made enormous efforts to disrupt Russian life. There is little doubt that
the attack on the schoolhouse at Beslan 10° was the most egregious form
of terrorism: the willful killing of hundreds of children at school.
An understanding of Russia's response to Chechen-based international
terrorism requires a historical overview. After the 1917 Russian Revolution,
108. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 91-94 (Jan. 2005).
109. The Anti-Terrorist Fence, supra note 101.
110. See Excerpts: State Department Noon Briefing, September 8: Russia, U.S.
Department of State Daily Press Briefing (Sept. 8, 2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/
2004/Sep/08-78370.html.
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the Chechens declared independence only to be occupied by the Bolsheviks,
who later established the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region in 1934."'1
Like their Ingush neighbors, Chechens are predominantly Sunni Muslim. 1
2
"During World War II, Chechen and Ingush units collaborated with
invading German Nazis. As a result, in 1944 Stalin deported many of them
to Central Asia and Siberia."' 13 "The mass deportation of Chechens is
estimated in the range of 400,000 to 800,000 with perhaps 100,000 or
more of these people dying due to extreme conditions."' 14 After Stalin died
in 1953, the deportees were repatriated, and the republic was reestablished
in 1957.
Upon the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, some regions broke away
and gained independence. However, Boris Yeltsin, the president of the
newly formed Russian Federation, refused Chechnya's declaration of
independence and sent troops to Chechnya instead, though these troops
withdrew when confronted by armed Chechens. 115 Tensions between
the Russian government and the Chechen president, Dzokhar Dudayev,
escalated into warfare in late 1994, when Russia invaded Chechnya and
a bloody war ensued.1 6 In 1996, Russia withdrew defeated, but Chechnya's
political situation continued to deteriorate. As the Chechen government's
control over militias eroded, local warlords gained strength over Chechnya's
citizens.'1 7 Meanwhile, the Soviet-Afghan war had attracted Islamic militants
and resistance fighters to Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan. In 1997,
Dudayev (who had been killed in a 1995 rocket attack) was replaced by
Aslan Maskhadov, who declared Islamic Shari-ah law in 1999.' 8 Following
a Chechen defeat in Dagestan, Moscow and other Russian cities suffered
bombings that killed more than 300 people.1 19 Chechens were blamed
for the attacks, and the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, responded
forcefully and brutally. 20 By June of 2000, Chechens had begun to fight
111. Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects
in Light ofInternational Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 120 n.36 (1999).
112. Id. at 123.
113. Anup Shah, Crisis in Chechnya, (last updated Sept. 4, 2004), http://www.
globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp?p=1.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see generally Miriam Lanskoy, Chechnya's Internal Fragmentation, 1996-1999,
27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 185 (2003).





back with suicide attacks and increased guerilla warfare. 121 Terrorist
attacks continue to originate from Chechnya, and the harsh Russian
response continues to be condemned by the international community.1
22
While some argue that Chechen terrorism is a home-grown nationalist
movement attempting to establish an independent Chechen state, the
Islamic nature of this movement, in conjunction with the operational,
financial, and logistical support provided by non-Chechen terrorists,
suggests that Russia faces terrorism that is not purely domestic. Therefore,
Russian operational, policy, and legislative responses directed against
Chechnya cannot be considered only a response to domestic terrorism.
Rather, Russia is confronted with international terrorism that is domestic
in orientation.
Chechen terrorism is unlike the 9/11 attack or the bombing of the
Madrid train station in March 2004, which were exclusively international
in execution. It more closely resembles the terrorism confronted by Israel
(Palestinian terrorist organizations with international assistance) or India
(Kashmirian terrorists supported by Pakistan).
In examining the Russian response to international terrorist organizations
that supports the Chechens, it must be noted that until recently, both the
Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia saw themselves as immune to
domestic and international terrorism. In the context of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union was the prime benefactor-covertly and overtly---of
international terrorism. Today, the international geopolitical configuration
has changed dramatically. Russia now faces a threat that is no less
international than the threat the United States is confronting. While the
threat is domestically based, the larger threat is similar-international
Islamic fundamentalism.
B. Russian Policy---Deterrence and Toughness
The Russian counter-terrorism principles are put forth in the Russian
Federation Federal Law no. 130-FZ, which was signed by President Yeltsin
on July 25, 1998:123
1) Legality;
2) The priority of measures to prevent terrorism;
3) The inevitability of punishment for terrorist activity;
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 1998, No. 130-FZ, ch. I, art. 2, available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm.
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4) The combination of overt [glasnyy] and covert [neglasnyy]
methods of fighting terrorism;
5) The integrated use of legal, political, socioeconomic,
and propaganda based preventive measures;
6) The priority of defending the rights of persons exposed
to danger as a result of terrorist action;
7) Minimal concessions to terrorists;
8) One-man command in the leadership of forces and resources
involved in conducting counter-terrorist operations;
9) Minimal disclosure of technical methods and tactics for the
conduct of counter-terrorist operations.
Chapter II, Article 5 of the Basic Principles of the Organization of the
Fight against Terrorism 124 states counter-terrorism efforts aim to:
1) Protect the individual, society, and the state from terrorism;
2) Prevent, uncover, and stop terrorist activity and minimize
its consequences;
3) Uncover and eliminate factors and conditions conducive
to the implementation of terrorist activity.
Speaking at the College of the Federal Security Service on January 17,
2004, President Vladimir Putin called the struggle against terrorism "a
key task of Russian special services. In the neutralization and liquidation of
the terrorist network, special services should be tough and systematic. Any
provocation of the terrorists should invite adequate tactics by the
security bodies.' 2 5
Toughness is clearly of paramount importance to the Russian authorities,
who are encouraged by the firm, popular opposition to attacks against
civilian targets to adopt a harsh, uncompromising response. During the
Moscow theatre hostage crisis, the use of an unspecified debilitating gas
to neutralize explosive-loaded Chechen terrorists was apparently sanctioned
by Vladimir Putin personally. 126 The Russian leadership was conscious
124. Id. ch. II, art. 5.
125. Andrei Shoumikhin, Deterring Terrorism: Russian Views, NATIONAL INSITITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY, Feb. 2004, at 1 (quoting Vladimir Mokhov, Toughly and Systematically,
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Jan. 17, 2004), http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/ Russian%2OWeb%2OPage/
February%20webpage.pdf.
126. See Matt Bivens, Chechnya War Making Not Breaking Terrorism, THE Moscow
TIMEs, Nov. 1, 2002, at 2557.
not only of the potential for a negative public reaction to any concession
to the terrorists, but also of the possibility that a harsh and swift response
might effectively deter similar acts in the future.
127
Russia's counterterrorism legislation and policy is telling: policymakers,
politicians, and leaders unequivocally and openly define Russia's approach
to counterterrorism as active and firm. The government has made it very
clear that it fully intends to pursue an operationally active counterterrorism
strategy, combined with maximum implementation of existing legislation.
In many ways this approach mirrors, or at least resembles, the American
and Israeli models. Accordingly, what must be analyzed is the government's
success in balancing national security and civil rights, or alternately,
whether President Putin, the legislature and the people do not place a
significant emphasis on this balance, as some have suggested.
President Putin has been criticized for a policy-particularly as
implemented by the Russian forces in Chechnya--of aggressive counter-
terrorism that violates basic human rights. It must be noted that both the
Duma and the Russian Federation Council have clearly granted the
executive wide latitude. The question is at what price. The criticism, as
noted below, is not insignificant:
While Russia has described its actions in Chechnya as a tightly focused counter-
terrorism operation, it has produced vast civilian casualties. The first phase of
the conflict involved the bombing and shelling of dozens of towns and villages
to dislodge Chechen fighters. Research by Human Rights Watch and other
organizations showed the shelling and aerial bombardment by Russian forces to
be highly indiscriminate and disproportionate, causing about 3,000 civilian
casualties. Between December 1999 and February 2000, Russian forces
committed massacres after taking control of three villages, killing at least 130
people. During this period they also rounded up thousands of people, mostly
males whom they called "potential terrorists," took them to detention centers,
and tortured them.
By the spring of 2000, Russian troops had established nominal control over
most of Chechnya and large-scale hostilities ceased. They continued to conduct
many "sweep operations," to seek out rebel fighters and ammunition depots.
Sweep operations have become synonymous with abuse, involving the arbitrary
detention of large numbers of Chechen civilians (along with captured fighters),
who are then beaten and tortured in detention.
This cycle of abuse, well established before September 11, continues to this day.
Hundreds of people have "disappeared" since that date after being taken into
Russian custody. Increasingly, Russian forces conduct targeted night operations,
in which masked troops raid particular homes, execute targeted individuals, or
take them away, never to be seen again.
127. Shoumikhin, supra note 125, at 1.
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In December 2002, Human Rights Watch documented nine extrajudicial
executions and seventeen forced disappearances by Russian forces, most of
which had taken place in the two months following a mass hostage taking in
Moscow by armed Chechens.
128
C. Russian Legislation
Russian Federation Federal Law No. 130-FZ129 was signed by President
Boris Yeltsin on July 25, 1998. Article 3 provides the following definitions:
"Terrorist crimes are envisaged by articles 205-208, 277, and 360 of the
Russian Federation Criminal Code. Other crimes envisaged by the Russian
Federation Criminal Code may be categorized as terrorist crimes if they
are committed for terrorist purposes. Penalties for the commission of
such crimes are determined in accordance with the Russian Federation
Criminal Code; a terrorist is a person participating in the implementation
of terrorist activity in any form; a terrorist group is a group of persons
united with a view towards implementing terrorist activity; a terrorist
organization is one that is created with a view towards implementing
terrorist activity, or deeming the use of terrorism possible in its activity.
An organization is deemed to be terrorist if even one of its structural
components carries out terrorist activity with the knowledge of even one of, "130
the organization's leading organs.
According to this legislation, terrorist activity is broadly defined: it
includes the organization, planning, preparation and implementation of
terrorist action. The significance of such a definition is that any individual
involved in any stage of a particular terrorist action-no matter its
significance or ultimate contribution to an attack-may be convicted of
the crime of terrorism. Much like the material support clause of the
Patriot Act,13 1 which led to the conviction of Lynne Stewart,'3 2 this
definition is very broad.
128. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES WORLDWIDE (Mar. 25, 2003), at 18-19, available at http://www.
humanrightswatch.org/un/chr59/counter-terronsm-bck.pdf [hereinafter HRW HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES WORLDWIDE].
129. See Russ. Federation Fed. Law No. 130-FZ, July 25, 1998, translation
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm (last visited Nov.
14, 2005); see also Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] arts. 205-08, 277, 360
(Russ.) (translated into English by William E. Butler & Maryann E. Gashi-Butler,
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 3rd ed.).
130. Russ. Federation Fed. Law No. 130-FZ, supra note 129, art. 3.
131. See Patriot Act, supranote 29, § 805, 115 Stat. at 377-78.
The historical backdrop for legislation must always be examined, for
legislation is not drafted in a vacuum. Chechen attacks against Russian
citizens have included the takeover of a schoolhouse, the bombing of
Moscow apartment buildings, various suicide bombs-including some
carried out by women-at popular events and the Moscow theatre takeover.
The Russian response to Chechen terrorism very much reflects a tough
line. This approach has been repeatedly articulated and defended by
Russian authorities: "Russian Police Demand Tightening of Laws in
Struggle Against Terrorism" is but one example of a headline following
the terrorist attack at Beslan. In 2003, the Russian Interior Minister stated
he was drafting proposals on ways to invigorate the struggle against
terrorism. 33 "I think the necessity to step-up the struggle against
terrorism must be reflected in our laws. We shall submit a proposal to
prolong the period of detention of those suspected of being involved in
terrorist acts to 30 days."' 134  In the aftermath of an explosion in a
Moscow subway this headline appeared: "Russian State Duma intends to
toughen all laws relating to the fight against terrorism."
' 135
According to an April 14, 2004 BBC report, the Russian Federation
Council, following a vote in the lower house, adopted amendments to
the Criminal Code, increasing the "period for bringing charges from 10
to 30 days in the case of an investigation of a terrorist nature. 136 The
Council adopted the resolution overwhelmingly (128 senators voting in
favor, three against and three abstaining).137
D. Russia Post-9/11
Following 9/11, Russia clearly toughened its counter-terrorism approach.
Whether or not this was an attempt to equate the attacks against the
United States with Chechen terrorism as a means to justify harsh internal
measures is a matter of some debate. What is clear from a series of
legislative issues initiated and acted upon is that 9/11 led the Russian
Federation to understand that international terrorism potentially affects
132. See Associated Press, Activist Lawyer Vows to Fight Terror Conviction,
MSNBC Feb. 11, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6948450/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
133. Mark A. Smith, Russian Domestic Policy: A Chronology July-September 2003,
DEFENCE ACADEMY: CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTRE, Jan. 14, 2004, at 5, available
at http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Chronologies/J37/J37.pt1.
134. Id.
135. Russian State Duma Intends to Toughen All Laws Relating to Fight Against
Terrism, RIA NovosTi [Russian News and Information Agency], Feb. 6, 2004, http//enrian.m/
onlinenews/20040206/39907054.html (on file with author).
136. See Smith, supra note 133, at 5; see also Russian Upper House Endorses
Changes To Law On Handling Suspect "Terrorists ", BBC MONITORING, Apr. 14, 2004.
137. Russian Upper House Endorses Changes To Law On Handling Suspect
"Terrorists", supra note 136.
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Russia as much as it does other nations. That is, unlike the Cold War era,
when the Soviet Union provided unending support to national liberation
movements, the Russian Federation is now just as much a target of
international terrorism as is the United States.
During the Cold War, the two great superpowers were polar opposites
in their approach to various national liberation movements. International
terrorism, as best exemplified by 9/11, clearly brought the Russian Federation
to embrace anti-terrorism methods it would not have considered applying
to international movements in previous years. Although the Soviet Union
had enacted and implemented harsh, generally cruel measures against
what it defined as internal dissent, its approach to nationalist movements
overseas was fundamentally different: the Soviet Union actively encouraged
such movements. The Russian response to the tragedy at the Beslan
schoolhouse clearly reflects a significant change in this policy. Russia's
response to international terrorism is very different from the way it
engaged and supported Cold War national liberation movements.
International criticism has been leveled regarding the imbalance
between national security and civil rights in some of the measures
Russia has adopted.13 8 However, there is little doubt that, in the context
of policy and legislative initiatives, the Russian Federation has developed an
understanding of terrorism that is diametrically opposed to that of its
predecessor. While it is unclear whether this change is based solely on a
response to 9/11, to Chechnya-based terrorism, or to a combination of
the two (or perhaps an understanding that a link exists between the two
and that Chechen terrorism is also international), little doubt exists that a
significant transformation has occurred in Russia.
One of the most interesting international political developments in the
post-Cold-War world is the growing realization by the nations of the
world that terrorism-the only real threat to modem society-must be
combated globally. If in the past the world was divided into three
camps-the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the nonaligned nations-today
there is only one superpower, the United States. However, defeating
terrorism, or at least engaging terrorists in a protracted war of attrition,
requires an international unification of efforts. It can perhaps be argued
that terrorism and the resulting policies of counter-terrorism will
significantly contribute to globalization. If in the past the Soviet Union
138. See Human Rights Watch: Human Rights News, Russian Federation/Chechnya:
Human Rights Concerns for the 61st Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
Mar. 10, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/russia10298.htm.
had its own political agenda, today, particularly post-Beslan, there appears
to be a growing realization in Russia that counter-terrorist efforts must
be combined. While differences of approach-on both a tactical and a
strategic level-and dissimilar political philosophies still exist, the
fundamental change in Russia would have been unimaginable a few
short years ago, and reflects the globalization of counter-terrorism efforts.
VI. SPAIN
A. Introduction
On March 11, 2004, 198 Spaniards were killed and more than 1,400
wounded in Madrid, as ten bombs exploded in commuter trains, just
three days prior to a national election. 139 According to most commentators,
the objective of the attacks was to influence the election and to compel
Spain to withdraw its forces from Iraq, where they had been part of the
coalition fighting against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Following the
election, which was won by the Socialist Party's Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,
140
Spain withdrew from Iraq in spite of strong international political pressure
to remain there. 141
In the following months, Spanish authorities arrested 62 people in
connection with the bombing, and more than 30 involved in the
planning of further attacks intended to be carried out in October 2004.142
According to Spanish sources, some of those arrested had connections to
international terrorism, suggesting not only that Spain is a target of
international terrorism, but furthermore, it has become an "entry point to
Europe" for terrorists. 
143
In a separate investigation conducted by National Court Judge Baltasar
Garzon, 35 individuals involved with al-Qaeda were indicted. 14" Judge
Garzon compiled a 692-page dossier in late 2003, which called for the
arrest of these men for their alleged involvement in the September 11
attack on the United States. 
145
139. Timeline: Madrid Investigation, BBC NEWS (world ed.), Apr. 28, 2004, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3597885.stm.
140. Id.
141. See Iraq: Spanish Troop Withdrawal a "Blow" to Coalition, GlobalSecurity.org,
Apr. 23,2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2004/04/wwwh40423.hn.
142. Neil Docherty & Lowell Bergman, Al Qaeda's New Front, Frontline, Jan. 26,
2005, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/front/map/es.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2005).
143. Renwick McLean, Spain Arrested More than 130 suspects in Islamic terrorism
in '04, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2005, at A6.
144. Profile: Judge Baltasar Garzon, BBC NEWS (UK ed.), Sept. 26, 2005, http://
news.bbc/co/uk/l/hi/Europe/3085482.stm.
145. Id.
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While today Spain is similar to the United States, Russia and Israel in
that it also faces Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, Spaniards have encountered
domestic terrorism for years. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland
and Liberty, or ETA) has waged a decades-long campaign against the
Spanish government in the hope of establishing an independent Basque
state.1 46 The Basques have killed hundreds, intimidated thousands, and
forced Spaniards to live under the threat of violence.
1 47
Spain's counter-terrorism legislation and policy has over the years
been tailored to the threat posed by ETA, rather than to international
terrorism. Like many other countries that have been threatened by domestic
or nationalist terrorism (e.g., the IRA in Britain, Hamas in Israel, and the
Chechens in Russia), the Spanish response to terrorism was developed to
meet a specific, internal threat. However, the Spanish government's
response to domestic-based terrorism is outside the purview of this
article, just as the American response to various right-wing militia
groups and the Israeli government's policy toward right-wing extremism
will not be examined. Russia has been included precisely because
Chechen terrorism, while nationalist in orientation, is supported by, and
therefore related to, global Islamic terrorism-much like the Hamas and
Islamic Jihad in Israel. This article's emphasis is national legislative and
policy responses to global terrorism, in particular, the way in which
existing legislation and policy is implemented or modified in response to
international terrorism. In the case of Spain, relevant legislation was
initially enacted for the purpose of combating domestic terrorism only,
and has been adapted to address international terrorism.
B. Spanish Domestic Legislation
Chapter VIII of the Spanish Criminal Code (Article 571) defines
terrorism as "belonging, acting in the service of or collaborating with
armed groups, organizations or groups whose objective is to subvert the
constitutional order or seriously alter public peace" 48 The significance
146. Renwick Mclean, Key ETA 'Commando' Leader Arrested, THE INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/
03/news/spain.php.
147. ERIK VAN DE LINDE ET AL., QUICK SCAN OF POST 9/11 NATIONAL COUNTER
TERRORISM POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 94
(2002).
148. JUDITH SUNDERLAND, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SPAIN: SETTING AN EXAMPLE?
COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN 16-17 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/spain0105/ [hereinafter HRW COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SPAIN].
of this legislation is that mere support-either direct or indirect-of
terrorism may lead to prosecution under the law. The low threshold
required for prosecution is reminiscent of the "material support" clause
of the Patriot Act. 1
49
The Spanish model serves as a point of discussion for an additional
issue: whether the legislative response to international terrorism should
differ from the response to internal terrorism. Over the years Spain's
domestic legislation has often been criticized for its human rights
violations vis-A-vis ETA. 150 Terrorists in Spain are tried at the Audiencia
Nacional (National High Court), which was created in 1977 and has
jurisdiction over "crimes committed by persons belonging to armed
groups or related to terrorist or rebel elements when the commission of
the crime contributes to its activity, and by those who in some way
cooperate or collaborate in the acts of these groups or individuals. 151
Appeals from the Audiencia Nacional are to be filed to the Criminal
Appeals Chamber, though this court is presently not operational.
Furthermore, Spain does not have a special antiterrorism law; terrorists
are brought to trial based on Spain's Criminal Code. 152 The primary
distinction between the treatment of terrorists and criminal defendants is
that, whereas a non-terrorist must be brought before a judge within 72
hours, a suspected terrorist may be held for up to five days without
seeing a judge (an additional 48 hours). Article 55(2) of the Spanish
Constitution provides procedures whereby fundamental rights may be
suspended in terror cases. 53  Furthermore, according to the Law of
Political Parties (Party Act) introduced in 2001, a political party that
supports terrorism may be outlawed.
154
Though these measures were enacted for the purpose of combating
domestic terrorism, Spain's response, in terms of legislation and policy
to 9/11, and more significantly to a major international terror attack on
its own soil should be considered. If in the past Spain's counter-terrorism
efforts were focused on the Basques, then the focus today must necessarily
be split or doubled.
As will shortly be discussed, the Spanish response to the bombings at
the train stations has been widely criticized for reflecting weakness, if
not capitulation, in the face of international terrorism. Whether this is a
149. See Patriot Act, supra note 29, § 805, 115 Stat. at 377-78.
150. See Tracy Wilkinson, Spain Could Do Better on Terror Suspects, Group Says;
Human Rights Watch Asserts, Among Other Things, that Detainees Need Greater Legal
Access, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A6.
151. HRW COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SPAIN, supra note 148.
152. Id. at 17-18.
153. Constituci6n [C.E.] art. 55(2) (Spain).
154. Id.
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result of Spain's experience with Basque terrorism or unrelated is unclear.
What is apparent is that Spain was totally unprepared for international
terrorism--despite having ample opportunity to apply the lessons
learned by other nations.
C. Spanish Response to Terrorism
1. 9/11
According to a Human Rights Watch report, after 9/11 Spain applied
its existing strict counter-terrorism regime to the investigation, apprehension,
and detention of suspected al-Qaeda operatives. The climate created by
the international campaign against terrorism provided Spanish authorities
with a further pretext to crack down on Basque separatists and supporters of
the pro-independence movement. Spanish authorities were also quick to
issue public statements equating stricter controls on immigration with
the war against terrorism, contributing to a climate of fear and suspicion
toward immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.
Spain's anti-terror laws permit the use of incommunicado detention,
secret legal proceedings, and pre-trial detention for up to four years.
155
The proceedings governing the detentions of suspected al-Qaeda operatives
apprehended in Spain in November 2001, July 2002, and January 2003,
among others, have been declared secret (causa secreta). The investigating
magistrate of the Audiencia Nacional, a special court that oversees
terrorist cases, can request causa secreta status for thirty days, consecutively
renewable for the duration of the four-year pre-trial detention period.
156
Secret proceedings bar the defense access to the prosecutor's
evidence, except for information contained in the initial detention order.
Without access to this evidence, detainees are severely hampered in
mounting an adequate defense.
In November 2002 the United Nations Committee Against Torture
(CAT) expressed serious concern about incommunicado detention under
Spain's criminal laws.157 A suspect can be held without access to an
155. HRW COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SPAIN, supra note 148.
156. Id. at 16.
157. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: Spain, 10, CAT/C/CR/29/3 (Dec. 23, 2002); European
Parliament Hearing on Human Rights in the European Union: Counter-Terrorism
Measures and the Prohibition against Torture and Ill-treatment, Submission by Human
Rights Watch, Apr. 24, 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/migrants/docs/eu-
counter-terrorism.pdf.
attorney, family notification, services such as access to health care, or
contact with the outside world. The CAT concluded that incommunicado
detention under these circumstances could facilitate acts of torture and
ill-treatment. 158  In Spain, most suspected terrorist detainees are held
incommunicado for at least the first 48 hours in custody.
Human Rights Watch has reported that "[i]n the aftermath of September
11, then Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique told El Pais that 'the
reinforcement of the fight against illegal immigration is also the
reinforcement of the fight against terrorism. ' ' 159 Furthermore, "[s]uch
political rhetoric has been accompanied by increasingly restrictive
immigration and asylum policies and practices, including police
harassment in Muslim and Arab migrant communities, which undermine
the right to seek asylum and contribute to the creation of a climate of
hostility toward all immigrants in Spain.' 6 °
The Party Act adopted in June 2002 enables the state to declare a
political party illegal if it fails to respect democratic principles and
values. With two exceptions, the legislation is aimed at Batasuna and,
accordingly, will not be further addressed. The Party Act allows the
government to block financial accounts and operations when it considers
that such a step might prevent terrorist activities. The bill authorizes the
administration to act not only against terrorist groups, but also against
those who support or help them.'16  On June 27, 2002, the Spanish
Congress of Deputies passed the LSSICE "Internet Law" which "obliges
ISPs to retain traffic logs of their customers for at least a year. An
opposition amendment bars police or intelligence officials from using
such data without court permission.''
162
158. Id..
159. HRW HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WORLDWIDE, supra note, at 128.
160. Id.
161. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Financing Osama, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.CoM, Feb. 25, 2005,
http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.asp?ID=1 7 13 6&p= 1 (last visited Nov.
14, 2005). Ehrenfeld states that,
Article 9 of the New Party Act, Organic Law 6/2002 of June 27, 2002
stipulates that a political party will be declared illegal if it systematically harms
fundamental rights and freedoms by promoting, justifying or exonerating
attacks against the right to life and the integrity of the individual, if it foments,
facilitates or legitimizes violence, or complements and supports the actions of
terrorist organizations.
Id.
162. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, THE INTERNET UNDER SURVEILLANCE 103
(2003), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/doc-2236.pdf.
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2. March 2004
What then was the response of Spanish law enforcement to the March
2004 train attacks? This response must be considered not only from the
criminal law and juridical perspective, but with respect to the political
decision to withdraw forces from Iraq. While dozens of suspected al-
Qaeda terrorists were arrested, indictments have not been filed, and
additional actions have not been taken. Furthermore, seven suspected al-
Qaeda terrorists committed suicide when an apartment they were in was
surrounded by the Spanish police.1
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Since March 2004, Spain has not enacted special or emergency legislation
in response to the death of 200 of its citizens. There are a number of
possible reasons for this non-response (which is a response in and of
itself):
1) The existing legislation was felt to be sufficient;
2) Spain did not want to be perceived as pursuing
Islamic terrorists;
3) Spanish authorities thought that the criminal law model
is appropriate for countering terrorism and therefore
no special legislation was needed.
In sum, rather than implementing numerous potential measures intended
to provide the law enforcement community additional powers, or
undertaking vigorous policy initiatives, the Spanish government adopted,
in response both to 9/11 and March 2004, a largely passive approach.
Furthermore, the newly elected government promptly withdrew Spanish
forces from Iraq.164
In its response to an international terrorist attack on its own soil, Spain
differs dramatically from the United States, Israel, and Russia. The
legislative and policy models developed by those three countries in
response to international terrorism have been proactive and aggressive.
The Spanish government's inconsistency in dealing with domestic and
international terrorism is palpable. Spain responded to domestic terrorism
with political, legislative, and operational resolve. Its response to international
163. HRW COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SPAIN, supra note 148.
164. Luke Harding, U.S. Reaches Deal with Leaders in Falluja: Threat to Seize City
by Force if Demands are Not Met, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 20, 2004, at 13,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1195640,00.html.
terrorism has introduced a profoundly different model--one that is
diametrically opposed to its approach to domestic terrorism.
There is no right or wrong answer to these questions, but if history is
any guide, acquiescence in the face of aggression has not served liberal
democracies well over the years. The Spanish response, in contrast to
others discussed in this article, does not seem to be consistent with a
developing global response to Islamic terrorism. As discussed in the
section addressing the United States, administration after administration
has struggled to develop a cohesive, consistent response. Apparently,
the current Bush administration has developed such a policy, though it is
under attack for failing to protect civil liberties in the United States. The
question that nations need to address is how best to respond to
international terrorism, while taking into account terrorists' likely
interpretation of those policies.
VII. INDIA
A. Introduction
Over the years India has faced complicated terrorist threats from
multilateral sources. 65 Israel's threat is Palestinian terrorism; Russia's
is Chechen terrorism; Spain's was Basque terrorism until March 2004.
The threats India faces come in many forms-ethnic separatists, nationalists,
and the disenfranchised.
166
India's challenge in developing coherent legal and policy responses is
to counter one threat without inviting criticism from another group,
which may feel that a particular policy or legislation unfairly infringes
their rights. Developing a response solely aimed at one group or one
particular threat without trampling on or infringing the rights of another
group or subset is extremely complicated and requires great sensitivity.
In examining Indian counterterrorism measures, what is clear is that
the challenge is posed by multiple sources. Like the United States, Israel,
Russia and Spain, India must develop policy and enact legislation that
fairly weighs national security against civil and political rights. However, it
must do so in a more complex environment than other nations have faced.
165. The Current Crisis in South Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Middle
East and S. Asia of the H. Comm. On Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. at 10 (2002) (statement
of Michael Krepon, Founding President, The Henry L. Stimson Center).
166. See Law Commission of India, 173rd Report on Prevention of Terrorism Bill,
2000 § 11 1.5-9 (2000), reprinted in L.K. Thakur, ESSENTIALS OF POTA AND OTHER
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS 58-60 (2002) (citing over 2000 militant-related deaths in the
northeast region of India during the late 1990s); see also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, 10-11, (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/10319.pdf (citing various terrorist threats in India).
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Besides facing religious strife in the form of Hindu-Moslem and Sikh-
based terrorism, the Indian government also faces terror threats
emanating from Kashmir that is encouraged, if not actually supported by
Pakistan. 16 7 All the while, India must be necessarily cognizant of the threat
posed by a nuclear-capable Pakistan. Accordingly, the Indian government
must develop counter-terrorism legislation and policy that can respond
democratically to truly multiple threats: 1) external (Pakistan); 2) domestic
(religious based); 3) mixed (Kashmirian terrorism partially supported by
Pakistan). Indian counter-terrorism legislation must be all-encompassing,
given the breadth of the threat, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 168 As
the scope of this survey is limited to international terrorism, India's
internal threats will not be addressed. Nevertheless, in discussing how a
nation responds to international terrorism, additional realities-such as
domestic terrorism--cannot be overlooked. The issue of India's counter-
terrorism policy must then be considered through this unique perspective.
B. Legislation
1. Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Act
In 1985 the Indian government approved the Terrorism and Disruptive
Activities (prevention) Act (TADA) (amended 1987).169 TADA was
enacted partly as a response to the death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,
who was assassinated by militant Sikh extremists in 1984.170 Rajiv
Gandhi, Indira's son and successor as prime minister, also supported the
legislation, because various militant groups throughout India were engaging
in continuing guerrilla attacks against the Indian state. 17 1 TADA expanded
the government's power to deal with persons classified as terrorists.1
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For example, it gave judges the discretion to hold trials of accused
terrorists in camera.173 Moreover, Section 21 of the Act presumed that
167. Id.
168. KSHITIJ PRABHA, TERRORISM: AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY 78-79, 90
(2001); CYNTHIA KEPPLEY MAHMOOD, FIGHTING FOR FAITH AND NATION: DIALOGUES
WITH SIKH MILITANTS 10 (1996).
169. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, No. 28 of 1987 (India)
[hereinafter TADA].
170. Jayanth K Krishnan, India's "Patriot Act": POTA and the Impact on Civil
Liberties in the World's Largest Democracy, 22 LAW & INEQ. J. 265,267 (2004).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 268.
173. Id. at 267; TADA, supra note 169, at part III, 16(1)-(3).
suspected terrorists were guilty until proven innocent. 174 Additionally,
the Act allowed the state to arrest anyone upon mere suspicion of
terrorist activity, and hold that individual without bail.175 During the
trial, a defendant did not have an automatic right to face his accusers in
court. 1
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While the Act was created to enable the government to counter
terrorism, the legislation died a natural death upon its expiration in 1995,
when public pressure forced parliament not to renew it.77 The reason
for this appears to be the consistent internal and international criticism
leveled against the government, accusing it of using the legislation as a
means to target minorities and political opponents.'78 The TADA
enhanced the state's power with regard to those it saw as a threat to
India's national security, which was reminiscent of the emergency rule
era. "During this nearly two-year period from 1975 to 1977, Indira
Gandhi suspended the democratic constitution, jailed thousands of her
opponents, and ruled by decree, arguing that the state faced a national
security threat from opposition forces both inside and outside of the
country." Many in India were concerned that "if the government's powers
were not kept in check, democracy in India could once again be in
jeopardy. By 1994, over 76,000 people had been arrested under TADA
with only about one percent of these detainees ever being convicted of
any crime."
Even though the TADA is no longer in effect, remnants of the law
remain. The government can still charge suspected persons retroactively
for crimes committed when the TADA was in effect. Additionally, the
Supreme Court held one of the central provisions of the TADA, which
allows uncorroborated witness statements gathered by the police to be
admitted into evidence, constitutional in 1994. This ruling surprised many
because "of the longstanding tradition, arising from a historic and
widespread public distrust of the police, prohibiting the admissibility of
this type of evidence."'
179
2. Prevention of Terrorism Act
The December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian parliament carried out by
five Muslim terrorists resulted in the enactment the Prevention of Terrorism
174. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 267-68; TADA, supra note 169, at part IV, 21.
175. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 268; TADA, supra note 169, at part IV, 24.
176. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 268.
177. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 268-69.
178. See K. Balagopal, Law Commission's View of Terrorism, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
June 17, 2000, vol. 35, no. 25, at 2114.
179. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 268-69.
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Act (POTA)."8 ° POTA was a source of great concern, as it creates an
overly broad definition of terrorism, while "expanding the state's investigative
and procedural powers."' 81 POTA shares many similarities with the TADA,
foreshadowing "a return to widespread and systematic curtailment of
civil liberties." 182 POTA allows suspects to be "detained for up to three
months without charge, and up to three months more with the permission
of a special judge."'
183
Since its passage, POTA has been used against political opponents, religious
minorities, Dalits, tribals and even children. In February 2003 alone, over three
hundred people were arrested under the act.
On February 19, 2003, the Gujarat government charged 131 Muslims under
POTA for allegedly attacking Hindus. Human Rights Watch investigations
revealed that attacks against Muslims were carried out with extensive state
participation and support and planned months in advance of the Godhra attack.
The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party that heads the state government
has not charged any Hindus under POTA for violence against Muslims.
184
Section 3 of the POTA defines terrorists and terrorist acts as:
(1) Whoever, (a) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or
sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people
does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or
inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or
noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological
or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a
manner as to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or
persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any
supplies or services essential to the life of the community or causes damage or
destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the
defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the government of
India, any state government or any of their agencies, or detains any person and
threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the government or any
other person to do or abstain from doing any act; (b) is or continues to be a
member of an association declared unlawful under the unlawful activities
(prevention) act, 1967 (37 of 1967), or voluntarily does an act aiding or promoting in
any manner the objects of such association and in either case is in possession of
any unlicensed firearms, ammunition, explosive or other instrument or substance
capable of causing mass destruction and commits any act resulting in loss of
180. HRW HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WORLDWIDE, supra note 128; see also Six Gunmen
Open Fire on Indian Parliament, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 13, 2001.
181. HRW HuMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WORLDWIDE, supra note 128.
182. Id. (Under TADA, tens of thousands of politically motivated detentions, acts
of torture, and other human rights violations were committed against Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits




human life or grievous injury to any person or causes significant damage to any
property, commits a terrorist act. For the purposes of this sub-section, "a
terrorist act" shall include the act of raising funds intended for the purpose of
terrorism. 1
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On September 17, 2004, the new Indian government of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh announced that it would honor its election pledge to
repeal POTA and amend its existing laws to target terrorist activity.'
86
The new government has acknowledged that certain provisions of POTA
allowed for widespread abuse, such as dispensing with the presumption
of innocence, the compulsory denial of bail, and the admissibility of
confessions despite the rampant use of torture and coercion by police
and security forces.
187
The complexity and scope of the threat India faces are apparent. Unlike
nations that face a single threat or a multitude of threats emanating from
a single source, India must develop and implement a balanced response
to three separate and distinct threats. This reality presents Indian leaders
with enormous challenges, especially difficult because India is a
democracy and is therefore obligated to balance legitimate national
security considerations with equally legitimate civil rights concerns.
None of the other nations surveyed here face challenges of such scope.
Besides facing three distinct threats, India is an immense subcontinent
with a large population, and must therefore contend with each of these
threats on a huge scale.
Home Minister Advani was quick to point out (during the debate on
the proposed legislation) that the Supreme Court had also made
recommendations as to police conduct during investigations. 188 According
to Advani, these recommendations were incorporated into the new
bill. 89 For example, under POTA defendants could invoke the right to
silence, and police had to provide warnings that anything defendants
said in the course of the interrogation could be used in court against
them.190 Moreover, POTA explicitly barred the police from using coercion
in order to obtain a statement from an individual. 19' The state could punish
any police official found to have abused this authority with a fine and up
185. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, Act No. 15 of 2002, available at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Prevention of Terrorism Act].
186. Human Rights Watch: Human Rights News, India: POTA Repeal a Step
Forward for Human Rights: Government Should Dismiss All POTA Cases (Sept. 22,
2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/22/india9370.htm.
187. Id.
188. See V. Venkatesan, POTA Prospects, 19 FRONTLINE, Mar. 30-Apr. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fll907/19070220.htm.
189. Id.
190. Prevention of Terrorism Act, supra note 185, art. 32(2).
191. Venkatesan, supra note 188.
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to two years in prison. POTA also afforded defendants the statutory
right to appeal a criminal conviction to a state high court.192 For these
reasons, both Advani and Prime Minister Vajpayee promised that POTA
could effectively combat terrorism, while protecting defendants' rights
to due process and a fair trial.
Some members of the opposition who argued against POTA's passage
charged that the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) was using POTA as a means
of pandering to its Hindu fundamentalist constituency. Others suggested
that POTA was not so much an anti-terrorism measure as a "terrorist law
[that would be] ... used to terrorise minorities." Still others worried that
the BJP would employ POTA as a tool to harass or threaten political
enemies who disagreed with government policy. These dissenting voices
nevertheless failed to carry the day, 193 though ultimately the Act was
repealed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has addressed the policy and legislative responses of the
five surveyed nations. All five nations face threats from international
terrorism, some of which are similar, and some which are not. Terrorist
threat that is domestic both in source and execution is not within the
purview of the article. The United States is clearly under attack from
international, radical fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, which has attacked
Americans both domestically and overseas. The American response to
9/11, as detailed above, has been twofold: the enactment of the Patriot
Act and establishment of the military commissions on the one hand, and
the approach delineated in the National Security Strategy Document on
the other. As noted, previous American administrations were unable to
implement a consistent policy, although they certainly articulated one.
Israel has responded over the years to Palestinian terrorism with a very
consistent policy. Over the past four years, that policy has included new
measures, such as targeted killings and the construction of a security
fence. Some of these policies have been frozen in response to a change
in Palestinian leadership. Russia has responded to Chechen terrorism
forcefully both in terms of policy and legislation. Though Chechnya is
seeking the creation of an independent state, the conflict is relevant to
this survey, because it is Islamic in focus and supported by external
192. Prevention of Terrorism Act, supra note 185, art. 34.
193. Krishnan, supra note 170, at 271-73.
Islamic sources. According to some, if the United States had not attacked
Iraq, Chechnya would have been the next great breeding ground for
Islamic terrorism, as Afghanistan was during the Soviet occupation.
Spain's response to international terrorism has been fundamentally
and diametrically opposed to that of the United States, Israel, and
Russia. While Spain had established a policy and enacted legislation to
counter the Basques that resembled the responses of the other countries
in this survey, its response to international terrorism has been thoroughly
out of step with these countries' response. India has confronted its
multitude of threats by enacting legislation that gives law enforcement
the tools necessary to counter terrorism. Though this legislation has
received criticism--e.g., from the Human Rights Watch report-India is
seemingly making significant efforts to implement a balanced approach
in response to multiple threats.
All five nations have fully functioning legal systems that are available
to try terrorists. All five have enacted legislation in response to terror attacks.
Finally, all five have developed a national policy in response to such
attacks. Four of the five have developed similar policies, while Spain has
gone down a very different road in response to international terrorism.
As we are clearly in the age of international terrorism, counterterrorism
measures must similarly be globalized. Undertaking a critical comparative
analysis of different nations' response to similar threats will enable the
targets of terrorism to develop the tools necessary to counter this great
threat. While the five surveyed nations have different cultures, political
systems, and pressures, histories and realities, their respective governments
are all charged with the same basic mission: to protect innocent citizens.
By examining, analyzing, and ultimately implementing theories and practices
from other countries, these nations will better be able to perform this
most important mission.
